Saturday, January 7, 2012

COLONEL GADDAFI: An Enigma


I was rummaging through my library and stumbled upon some interesting information about the recently lynched Libyan leader Col. Moammer Gaddafi as he was in 1974.

Indeed in the relatively short span of five years since he overthrew the feudal monarchy of King Idris in Libya, Gaddafi has become a mythical figure in the Arab world. His popularity with the generality of the people is unquestioned and he has assured his place among the radical Third World leaders by successfully tackling the international oil magnates who once dominated his country’s vast ‘black gold’ oil resources.

It may seem odd therefore to ask the question: is Gaddafi’s star fading? But recent events in Libya and the Arab world, as well as complementary incidents in Black Africa, make the question relevant.

A few months ago a surprise announcement from Tripoli said that Col. Gaddafi had given up all state offices and that he would henceforth devote himself to party and spiritual matters. The implication was quickly seized upon that he had been given the push by his colleagues in Libya’s ruling Revolutionary Command Council. Disagreements between Col. Gaddafi and his colleagues in the past were no secret. In fact four times before he had resigned from the Council but was persuaded to resume his state duties.

Rumours had it that on one occasion force was actually used to prevent him from announcing his resignation on Tripoli Radio. On the recent occasion however, his colleagues appear not to have gone out of their way to restrain their reluctant leader from relinquishing state offices.

The Minister of Information attempted to scorn any speculation that Col. Gaddafi has been relieved of his duties.Col Gaddafi he explained hates protocol and ‘red carpet’ treatment. He does not like the military parades and the ritual of airport receptions for visiting heads of state. This left observers speculating that that the Libyan leader would withdraw into a role similar to that of Chairman Mao, away from the glare of publicity, but directing the affairs of the state from relative obscurity. If it is true that this what Col. Gaddafi preferred, the execution of Libya’s policies in the months since he virtually disappeared from the headlines does not seem to bear that distinct hallmark of Gaddafi’s personality to which we have become familiar with.

Major Jalloud, the ostensible number two man in the RCC, to whom Col.Gaddafi relinquished the office of Prime Minister two years ago following one of the periodic squabbles in the inner circle of Libya’s young rulers, was again in Moscow just before the recent OAU Summit, which he and not Col.Gaddafi attended.Gaddafi is known to be strongly anti-communist and his stance has created difficulties with Moscow in the past.

When Libya nationalised British Petroleum concessions in December1971 it needed Soviet assistance, and Major Jalloud undertook the mission to Moscow. His brief, at Gaddafi’s insistence, was explicit: Soviet technicians in no circumstances would be allowed to exercise political activity or promote communism, and Libya would not relax its policy of combating communism at home. It was not easy mission for Major Jalloud as the Russians were clearly peeved by what seemed to them Gaddafi’s uncalled-for insinuations. Major Jalloud’s most recent mission appears to have been conducted in a more cordial atmosphere, with Gaddafi’s direct influence now apparently out of the way.

Some months ago Gaddafi told a group of Libyan farmers that Arab unity would be achieved by any means, and he left no one in doubt that he meant internal revolutions. The warning came in just less than a fortnight after Col. Gaddafi and President Bourguiba of Tunisia jointly proclaimed an agreement to merge their two countries. Col.Gaddafi had made unification of Arab states a personal crusade and had committed both his own energy and the wealth of his country to the cause.

Over the past sixteen years several attempts have been made to forge unions in the Arab world. All have failed.

Indeed, only last year Egypt and Libya agreed to a merger. That merger itself was in addition to an existing Federation of Arab Republics which linked Egypt and Libya with Syria on paper. But neither the Federation nor the Egypt-Libya union got off the ground. Egypt and Libya went so far as to exchange Ministers and all that was left was for a Union President to be named.

But even before the desert dust had begun to settle down following the October Middle East war Col.Gaddafi publicly complained he had not been informed in advance of Egypt and Syria’s decision to attack Israel forces.Furhermore,he was not consulted before Egypt agreed to a ceasefire, although he had given financial support and material aid to Egypt’s war efforts. Consequently Col. Gaddafi withdrew his representatives in Cairo.

The projected merger with Tunisia caused him even more trouble. President Bourguiba had been a consistent advocate of a federation that would link the Maghreb states of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and possibly Mauritania, which joined the Arab League last year. But there e were political differences which made a Libya-Tunisia merger seem unlikely. One area of divergence which had been an impediment in the Libya-Egypt merger was the place of Islamic faith in the society. Col.Gaddafi had effectively returned Libya to Islamic Law, while Tunisia, like Egypt has adopted a visibly Western approach to society, thus granting equal status to the country’s emancipated women.

Meanwhile, Algeria and Morocco took exception to not being consulted before Djerba agreement between Gaddafi and Bourgouiba.Algeria, in fact had been quietly moving toward the realisation of a Maghreb federation. Belatedly President Bourguiba invited other Arab states to join the Libya-Tunisia union, but it was a none starter, Egypt’s reply was limited to a tight-lipped comment by the Deputy Prime Minister, Abdel Kader Hatem,who said that his country supported any unity between one Arab country and another. It was not surprising when, within a week of the Djerba agreement, Tunisia began to manoeuvre itself out of the commitment.

President Bourguiba fired his Foreign Minister, who had been instrumental in getting the agreement signed. Tunisia Prime Minister Hedi Nouira commented that the Djerba agreement was’ a proclamation of an ideal, an affirmation of a principle and the definition of an objective,’Otherwise,he made it clear, Tunisia preferred evolution to revolution and would rather opt for a confederation or a federation that would embrace its Maghreb neighbours.

Desperate to produce results, Col. Gaddafi pursued President Bourguiba to Switzerland where the latter had gone for medical treatment. But Col.Gaddafi charm could not persuade the Tunisian leader to show more interest in the proposed merger. Instead, the Libyan leader received what was an obvious slap in the face. Former Foreign Minister Masmoudi was ordered to appear before a party disciplinary committee on charges of ‘indiscipline and acts incompatible with the policies of the Head of State, the party and government.’

Col.Gaddafi failure to obtain a merger with Tunisia was his last major attempt to unify the Arabs before retiring into what now appears his self imposed exile. Perhaps it had all become too much for him and he decided to retreat for a while, as some observers have speculated...On the other hand it is possible that his colleagues felt that they had had enough of arbitrary policies. Libya was gaining enemies by now and became isolated in the Arab world. Even fellow radical Syria, which never quite warmed to Gaddafi, was gradually edging towards Cairo’s example of ceasefire with Israel, opposed by Gaddafi.At any rate the failure of Djerba agreement was the beginning of several metaphorical slaps in the face that Col.Gaddafi subsequently had to endure.

Where once he rubbed shoulders with Nasser, and his statements were awaited with breathless animation, other Arab leaders do not seem to find it difficult these days to by-pass Col. Gaddafi.Even stronger evidence of his present low stock is that some seem to have gone out of their way to embarrass him. Egypt formally (and perhaps unnecessarily) awarded its citizenship to ex-King Idris who took up asylum in Cairo after his overthrow.

Then, less than 24 hours after Major Jalloud left Cairo following discussions with President Sadat, in May Egypt’s official Middle East Agency quoted a responsible' source’ as saying that Cairo had rejected both form and the content of two messages from Col. Gaddafi which apparently had made overtures for the resumption of good neighbourliness. The contrast in the cordial reception given to Major Jalloud and the press release soon after his visit attacking Gaddafi seemed a calculated attempt to pointedly isolate Gaddafi as the stumbling block hampering the resumption of close relations.

In April, the Egyptians accused Tripoli of having engineered a plot to overthrow President Sadat. Since then the allegation has been further elaborated so that Gaddafi, not the Libyan Government, is seen to be the villain.

Sudan has added its charges, accusing Gaddafi of being behind a plot to overthrow the government of General Nemeiry.It is all reminiscent of the kind of charges that were flung at Nasser’s door, of course, but the question is whether Gaddafi has had time to build the kind of personal following in Libya sufficient to overwhelm any attempt to edge him sideways. For although immensely popular with the people, he seemed not to have possessed the will for personal authority.

Indeed, he has been an almost reluctant hero.Gaddafi created conditions under which no one man had the power to dominate the RCC may appear to have way with a lot, but the occasional flashes of temper within the RCC and the fact that it was always Gaddafi who threatened or tried to resign is proof that he was never the unchallenged leader.

After the October Middle East war and the massive support given by Black African states to the Arabs, it was hotly discussed how Arab influence had suddenly become a factor to be reckoned with in Africa south the Sahara. Two names were mentioned as catalyst that brought about the anti-Israel OAU stand: Saudi Arabia’s King Feisal and Libya’s Col.Gaddafi.

In May the relations between Uganda’s General Idi Amin and Col. Gaddafi became strained, following reports that the Ugandan embassy in Tripoli had been downgraded with the transfer of the ambassador to Cairo. A little later, a Radio Uganda report said President Amin had ordered his ministers not to accept further assistance from Libya. Exactly a week later the Radio Uganda broadcast Gabon became the second Black African state to publicly express dissatisfaction with Tripoli. The government announced it had decided to terminate, with immediate effect, the contract of cooperation it signed with Libya in 1973.The announcement said that the Libyans were not fulfilling their part of the agreement.

Not many months before, Gabonese President Omar Bongo visited Libya and in a show of Afro-Arab fraternity announced that he had converted to the Moslem faith and changed his first name from Albert to Omar. The romance quite obviously has not endured.

Col.Gaddafi engaged in politics in a manner more erratic than cunning, and confronted his opponents with style more outrageous than devious. As a young man seeking to endow himself with the conscience of the Arab world, he plunged into Arab politics with his heart bared, uncaring whether or not he left his head behind. It may well be that Gaddafi drove himself too fast and he has burned his fingers in the process.

Sadly his dream of going down in history as the reincarnation of Saladin, the twelfth century Islamic warrior who crushed the Crusaders at Acre and brought glorious pride to Arab history turned into a nightmare in the Year of Our Lord Two Thousand and Eleven.